An $805 million sanctions pipeline fed precision bombs to civilian sites; a bomb casing stamped 18 days before the strike tells the story in miniature.
An unexploded Russian guided bomb recovered outside Kharkiv's Epicentr hypermarket on May 25, 2024 was stamped "07.05.24," meaning it left a factory just 18 days before the strike that killed 19 civilians and injured 54 others. The bomb was one of a new generation of precision munitions with accuracy ranges between 10 and 50 feet, guided by navigation systems that investigators say rely on Western microelectronics still flowing into Russia despite sanctions. The underlying investigation, conducted by NAKO and the International Partnership for Human Rights and supported by Hunterbrook Media, which holds a short position in several named companies, traced more than 1,100 foreign components inside Russian Su-34 and Su-35S military aircraft to 141 Western companies, and analyzed more than 180,000 customs shipment records showing roughly $805.6 million in microelectronics reached Russia in 2023 alone.
Ticker: N/A (investigation covers multiple public companies including $INTC, $TXN, $ADI)
Research Firm: Hunterbrook Media
Report URL: https://hntrbrk.com/investigations/jet-report?ref=shortreport.fyi
Position Disclosure: Hunterbrook Media holds a short position in several of the named companies.
Thesis
NAKO, IPHR, and Hunterbrook Media allege that Western microelectronics continue to reach Russian Su-34 and Su-35S military aircraft through sanctions-evading supply chains, enabling precision strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets that investigators argue constitute war crimes.
- Chips Inside Russian Jets: Investigators identified 227 verified foreign components from 59 companies in eight countries inside the Su-34, and 891 components from 138 companies inside the Su-35S, independently confirmed by NAKO using online datasheets and marketplaces including DigiKey and Mouser.
- U.S. Manufacturers Dominate the Component Count: Analog Devices (102 components), Texas Instruments (120), and Murata (123) account for the largest individual tallies; Intel, AMD, Maxim, OnSemi, and Vicor are also named as suppliers of parts described as enabling precision targeting, navigation, and communications.
- $805 Million Sanctions Leak in a Single Year: Analysis of more than 180,000 customs shipment records from 2023 estimated approximately $805.6 million in microelectronics reached Russia, with Intel-linked goods accounting for $365.8 million, Analog Devices $260.9 million, and Texas Instruments $133.4 million; goods moved predominantly via intermediaries in Hong Kong ($384.5 million) and China ($166.6 million).
- Components Reaching a Named Russian Defense Manufacturer: NAKO's 2024 findings showed the Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant, a producer of bomb aiming and laser guidance equipment within Rostec's Shvabe Holding, received more than $370,000 in microelectronics from Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, Intel, and others through Shvabe's Chinese subsidiary.
- Texas Instruments' Alleged Non-Response to Trace Requests: A U.S. Senate investigation found that Texas Instruments, which says it stopped selling into Russia and Belarus in February 2022, allegedly failed to respond to more than 100 trace requests from external investigators between August 2022 and February 2024 regarding its components in Russian weapons used in Ukraine. The report says TI responded to investigators only with a general statement and did not address specific questions about how 120 identified components reached Russian aircraft.
- Sanctions Evasion via Contorted Trade Routes: Serbia was listed as the stated origin for $50.9 million in transactions, but $21.8 million of those goods arrived in Russia from Hong Kong and $21.3 million from Sri Lanka, routed through 13 ostensibly Serbian companies.
- Intermediary Firms Openly Marketing Evasion Services: A Saint Petersburg-based company allegedly promoted "parallel imports" of sanctioned goods through partners in Turkey, Europe, the UAE, Serbia, and Armenia, and described the work on its website as an exciting game of overcoming obstacles.
- Weapons Precision Supports the Inference of Deliberate Civilian Targeting: The KAB guided bombs, UMPB D30-SN bombs, and Grom-E1 cruise missiles used in the examined strikes have accuracy ranges of 10 to 50 feet; investigators geolocated impact sites, established weapons used, and say they found no military targets in the vicinity of 10 strikes on hospitals, schools, shopping areas, and residential buildings that caused 26 civilian deaths and 109 injuries. Whether those strikes constituted war crimes is an allegation by the report's authors; it has not been adjudicated.
Catalysts
- Continued or intensified Senate scrutiny of named U.S. tech companies: The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has already held one hearing titled "The U.S. Companies' Technology Fueling the Russian War Machine"; further hearings or formal enforcement referrals would directly pressure Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, and Intel on export-control compliance.
- Potential U.S. termination of war-crimes accountability funding: Reuters reported in June 2025 that the White House was considering ending funding for nearly two dozen war-crimes and accountability programs globally, including Ukraine-related programs; if enacted, this could reduce the investigative and legal infrastructure underpinning this report's accountability case.
- Reported halt in U.S. missile defense shipments to Ukraine: The report cites a halt in U.S. missile defense system shipments to Ukraine; any policy reversal or escalation affecting Ukraine's defense posture could change the operational context for the precision-strike evidence.
- Ongoing Russian airstrike operations cited in the report: The report references continued and intensified Russian attacks over the summer; each further documented use of Western-component-equipped aircraft in civilian strikes could add evidence relevant to the legal and regulatory case.
- Next quarterly and annual SEC filings from named companies: Export-control disclosures or material updates from Intel, Texas Instruments, and Analog Devices in upcoming filings would show whether the companies have updated their compliance characterizations in response to the Senate hearing and this investigation.
Company Response
NAKO, IPHR, and Hunterbrook contacted 143 companies in summer 2024 and spring 2025; 44 responded. Analog Devices described a comprehensive export-control program and said it blocked $66 million in suspicious sales in fiscal year 2023. Texas Instruments issued a general statement saying it opposes use of its chips in Russian military equipment and stopped selling into Russia and Belarus in February 2022, but the report says it did not respond to specific questions about compliance measures, supply-chain oversight, or how its 120 identified components reached Russian aircraft. Murata said it was aware of media reports but said it was unclear whether the products found in Russian military jets were actually manufactured by Murata. Peak Electronics said a converter found in Su-35S wreckage traced to a model discontinued in 2006. ITT said its microswitch was produced only between 2000 and 2007 and has an essentially indefinite shelf life. NEC said its LCD module left the supply chain no later than 2011. The remaining 99 of 143 contacted companies did not respond.
Notable Details
- Of the 891 components identified inside the Su-35S, 58.9 percent fall under stricter export control regulations, meaning the majority of the parts identified in one of Russia's primary air-superiority fighters were already subject to heightened oversight before the war.
- A 19-second pilot-perspective video posted online shows bombs gliding toward the entrance of a Kharkiv café; the report says the attack injured 12 civilians including a 16-year-old. A separate bomb inscribed "Greetings from Belgorod! 22.05.24" was photographed on a Su-34 by a pro-Russian blogger whose post date and location the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine separately confirmed matched a documented strike.
- Ukrainian weapons experts and the State Aviation Research Institute in Kyiv and the State Research Institute for Testing and Certification of Weapons and Military Equipment in Cherkasy assessed that Ukraine, as of 2025, still lacked the capability to effectively intercept UMPB D30-SN bombs, which investigators describe as Russian analogues to the American GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb with comparable accuracy of 10 to 25 feet.
- The investigation is described as the third in a series, built on NAKO's earlier 2024 work linking customs data to Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant shipments, suggesting a cumulative evidentiary record rather than a single-publication claim.
- The Epicentr hypermarket struck on May 25, 2024 is described in the report as the rough Ukrainian equivalent of Walmart; the fire that followed the strike covered 140,000 square feet and burned for 16 hours.
"The company's website allegedly described its work as 'an exciting game, in which we constantly overcome the obstacles, while the level of difficulty increases.'"
The report's authors cite this passage, taken from what they describe as an archived version of a Saint Petersburg-based intermediary's website, as the most direct illustration of the alleged attitude behind commercial sanctions evasion.
FAQs
What is the short case on the named ticker companies from this report?
The investment-relevant angle is regulatory and reputational. Documented flows of components into sanctioned Russian military systems, a Senate hearing already on the record, and an ongoing investigation by NAKO and IPHR collectively raise the probability of further enforcement attention, mandatory compliance overhauls, or reputational pressure on major revenue relationships. Analog Devices disclosed it blocked $66 million in suspicious sales in fiscal year 2023, indicating the exposure is live and active. Texas Instruments, per the report, did not respond to over 100 trace requests from external investigators between August 2022 and February 2024.
How are Western components getting into Russia if sanctions ban the trade?
The investigation traced a network of intermediary jurisdictions and trading companies. Goods moved predominantly through Hong Kong ($384.5 million) and China ($166.6 million) as transit points, with Serbia cited as a third major hub where 13 ostensibly Serbian companies facilitated transactions whose goods actually arrived in Russia from Hong Kong and Sri Lanka. One Saint Petersburg-based company allegedly advertised these services as "parallel imports" on its public website, citing partners in Turkey, Europe, the UAE, Serbia, and Armenia. Anastasiya Donets of IPHR described Russia as having "mastered the art of circumventing sanctions."
What specific attacks does the report examine, and what evidence links them to Western components?
The report examines 10 attacks investigators describe as possible war crimes, including the May 25, 2024 strike on the Epicentr hypermarket in Kharkiv, which killed 19 civilians and injured 54. Investigators geolocated impact sites, established the weapon types used (including UMPB D30-SN bombs with 15 to 30 feet accuracy and GLONASS navigation), and say they found no military targets within the weapons' accuracy ranges. The connection to Western components runs through the platform: the Su-34 aircraft delivering those bombs contains 227 verified foreign components from companies including Texas Instruments and Analog Devices, which investigators say enable the jet's targeting, navigation, and communications systems.
What did the companies say when they were contacted?
Of 143 companies contacted, 44 responded. Analog Devices described its compliance program and cited $66 million in blocked suspicious sales in fiscal year 2023. Texas Instruments issued a general statement opposing use of its chips in Russian military equipment but did not, per the report, address how its 120 identified components reached Russian aircraft. Murata said it was unclear whether the products found in Russian military jets were actually manufactured by Murata. Several smaller manufacturers suggested the components involved came from legacy production runs discontinued years or even decades before the war: Peak Electronics cited a model discontinued in 2006, ITT cited production between 2000 and 2007, and NEC said its component left the supply chain no later than 2011.
What are the legal implications the report raises?
The report's legal argument, made by Anastasiya Donets of IPHR, is that the 10 examined strikes constitute war crimes under the Rome Statute, to which Ukraine is a party. The specific legal claim is that Russian forces deliberately targeted civilian buildings and specially protected sites including schools and hospitals, and that the precision of the weapons used (10 to 50 feet accuracy) makes accidental targeting implausible. The report further argues that Western companies whose components contribute to these capabilities have "not only legal, but also a moral obligation" to prevent such use, though no criminal charges against any company are cited. The International Criminal Court framework is referenced as the applicable legal standard.
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